Ontology: Does Atheism Bear the Burden of Proof?

What could be more foolish than to believe without reason? This question has been asked of religion for centuries, if not millennia, and has become especially acute in the past several decades in the midst of the rise of atheism. But the argument that it makes hinges on the idea that disbelief in God, rather than belief, is the logical assumption in the absence of evidence suggesting the contrary. And of course, this makes sense:

Consider the analogy that is Russell's Teapot. It is often invoked as the idea that because it is possible a teapot exists between Earth and Mars, one must! The point, of course, is to posit that religious belief is analogous to belief in the teapot: Absurd absent evidence that it does exist. The conclusion? The burden of proof lies squarely on the theist to justify his belief. (Of course, the analogy of the teapot Russell originally meant to be representative of unfalsifiable claims, but whether or not the conception of God is an unfalsifiable one is not the question at hand.)

Russell's Teapot, Illustrated

It was likely a chilly, dreary England night when Anselm took this preconception by the horns, and put pen to paper to create the first, and most widely cited version of the ontological argument in the mid-eleventh century. It goes as follows:

It is true by definition that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.

God exists as an idea in the mind.

A being that exists in the mind and in reality is greater than one which exists only within

the mind.

That is, if God exists only in the mind, then we can imagine something greater than

God. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.

Therefore, God exists in both the mind and reality.

With more modern forms of logic came more sophisticated versions:

Let us define God as “that which none greater than may be conceived”.

If it is possible God can exist, then he exists somewhere within the set of logically

possible universes.

However, we can certainly conceive of a being greater than one which exists within only

a limited number of the set of logically possible universes.

Therefore, God must exist within all universes in the set of logically possible universes.

As our universe exists within the set of logically possible universes, God exists within our

universe.

The phrasing is different, but the fundamental idea is not dissimilar: If God can exist, it can be assumed God must exist a priori. It completely reverses the tables on the atheist conjecture, placing the burden of proof on the assertion that God does not exist. However, let us scrutinise this argument a little more: Both variations, and indeed nearly all variations of the argument, begin by defining God. Whether that definition is a “maximally great being” as is more contemporary/lay phraseology or the “greater than” conception, all of them rely on said definition to justify the leap between an imaginary state of affairs to an existing one.

Anselm of Canterbury – creator of the Ontological Argument

Of course, the argument stands well if we adopt a traditional understanding of the word “great”. Great is more expansive, more complex, and more powerful. All of those justify the aforementioned leap. But entertain the idea, for a moment, that what constitutes a being that is “great” is completely arbitrary. Whether nonexistence is greater than existence seems a silly question until you consider that the standard is simply a matter of perception. The argument seems to have a fatal flaw in that the way one must necessarily define terms to reach the conclusion, specifically God, is rooted in a subjective term.

Naturally, there are schools of thought that would argue that this particular line of thought is invalid on the basis that our conception of “great” draws from an essence extrinsic to the world. A Platonic thinker may well suggest that there is an indescribable sense of what “greater” is that transcends the suggestion that its standard is arbitrary within the Realm of Forms. Similarly, Wittgenstein would suggest that as language is delimited by what is real and comprehensible that “great” does indeed have some sort of objective meaning outside of our subjective judgements. (He may instead suggest God, like certain mathematical contradictions having to do with infinity, exists outside of the human ability to picture, that is to comprehend, and consequently is not a concern of ours to be discussing.)

So the Ontological Argument only succeeds in its goal to shift the burden of proof to the atheist if it can also prove that there exists an objective standard qualifying the word great as something which isn’t simply subjective. Ultimately, this results in theism tragically having to confront and solve another great boogeyman: Subjectivity.